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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEAN LEVANGER and REBECCA 
LEVANGER, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
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JOANN VINCENT, KEN FISHER, DIANE 
DUPLANTY, RON DUPLANTY, JAN 
NEMCIK, BECKY NELSON, ROSIE 
PETRONELLA, CORY ALSBERG, 
GERALD VINCENT, SANDY FISHER, 
SCOTT FEATHERSTONE, MARTIN 
ROGUSCHKA, LANCE SWEDISH 
LAUREL KANGAS, JOHN DOES 1-5, 
JANE DOES 1-5, and HIGHLAND 
ESTATES PROPERTIES OWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, INC. , 
Defendants/Appellees . 
JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1996). The appeal was transferred to the 
Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I 
The issues presented for review are these: 
1. Did the Homeowners Association violate Utah statute and 
its charter documents in approving amendments to its CC&R's by 
way of mail-in balloting, open extensions of voting periods, and 
without a determination of those members entitled to vote? 
2. Was it an abuse of the trial court's discretion to deny < 
plaintiff's motion to reconsider solely on the grounds that the 
1 
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motion was too late, without considering new evidence proffered 
by plaintiffs in support of their motion? 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review on an appeal from the granting of a 
motion for summary judgment is that no deference is given to the 
trial court's conclusions, which are reviewed for correctness. 
Kunz & Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765, 768 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). 
As is the case whenever we consider an appeal from a 
summary judgment, we review the trial court's legal 
conclusions, including its conclusion that the material 
facts are not disputed, for correctness. See Utah 
R.Civ.P. 56(c) (stating that summary judgment is 
appropriate only if "there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law"). This standard 
allows us to make our own conclusions and does not 
obligate us to defer to the trial court. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
The party against whom summary judgment is rendered is 
entitled to all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 
facts. McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2 392, 393 (Ut. Ct. App. 1997) 
("we note that in reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view 
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party"). 
As regards the appeal from the denial of plaintiff's motion 
to reconsider, the standard of review is one of abuse of 
discretion. Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1997). The 
court in Lund further noted: "In reviewing such a motion, we 
accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law but 
review them for correctness." Id. 
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STATUTES AND RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS OF 
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Application of §§ 16-6-27 through 33 of the Utah Nonprofit 
Corporation and Co-operative Association Act, Utah Code Annotated 
(1995 Replacement), is of central importance to the appeal. 
These provisions contain the requirements for holding meetings by 
members of the Homeowners Association, including determining 
those entitled to vote, voting requirements and actions taken by 
members without meetings. Section 16-6-33 provides the only 
statutorily prescribed alternative to meetings of members, 
allowing action to be taken by members without a meeting only if 
"a consent in writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall 
be signed by all of the members entitled to vote with respect to 
the subject matter thereof . . . ." Id. Applied in conjunction 
with the Homeowners Association charter documents, these statutes 
require the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment 
for the Homeowners Association to be reversed. 
Proper application of Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure is of central importance to plaintiffs' appeal of the 
i 
trial court's denial of their motion to reconsider. The trial 
court misapplied the law in ruling that the motion to reconsider 
was procedurally flawed, due to timeliness and waiver. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a derivative action brought by plaintiffs on behalf ( 
of members of the Homeowners Association similarly situated to 
3 
4 
seek rescission of the Association's execution and recording of 
amended CC&R's, approved by way of written ballot without benefit 
of a members meeting, as required by law. Plaintiff's seek 
injunctive relief and damages against those responsible for the 
illegal acts. 
Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiffs filed their complaint January 21, 1997. R.9. 
Defendant Homeowners Association filed its answer February 26, 
1997. R.77. 
The Homeowners Association filed a motion for summary 
judgment November 26, 1997. R. 198. A hearing on the motion was 
heard by the Third District Court, the Honorable Ronald Nehring 
presiding, on January 9, 1998. R. 411. The Court issued an 
order granting the motion for summary judgment on May 28, 1998. 
R. 467. 
Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the decision 
granting summary judgment or to certify the order as final and 
appealable on July 16, 1998. R. 479. The Court denied the 
motion to reconsider and granted the motion to certify the 
summary judgment as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) in its Order of 
March 3, 1999. R. 1063. 
The LeVangers filed a Notice of Appeal on March 31, 1999. 
R. 1074. The case subsequently was poured-over to the Court of 
Appeals by Order dated May 18, 1999, and filed May 20, 1999. 
(The Order has no Bates stamp in the record on appeal but the 
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index to the record indicates that it should be page 1145 of the 
record on appeal.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1* In August of 1994, the Board of Trustees of the 
Homeowners Association caused amended CC&R's to be submitted for 
approval by members of the Association solely by means of written 
ballot. R. 53-54. 
2. The notice of the balloting sent to members was not 
sent to each member. Affidavit of Michael Ferrigno, current 
President of the Association, R. 473. Mr. Ferrigno's testimony 
is uncontroverted. 
4. I did not vote in 1994 when the Highland 
Estates Properties Owners Association proposed to amend 
the CC&R's for the subdivision because I did not 
receive any notice of the vote. 
5. I did not receive any letters soliciting my 
vote, did not receive copies of the proposed amendments 
to the CC&R's, nor was I given a ballot with which to 
cast my vote. 
3. The Association mischaracterized the affidavit 
testimony of Scott Welling, indicated to the trial court that he 
testified "Mr. Welling's letter [notice of the balloting], along ' 
with a ballot and a voting draft of the Amendment to Declaration 
of Restrictions and Protective Covenants was hand-delivered to 
each of the members of Highland Estates. (See Affidavit of Scott 
Welling)/' (emphasis added) R. 205. 
i 
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4. No where in Mr. Welling's Affidavit does he testify 
that the materials were hand delivered to every member of the 
Association. See R. 303-309. 
5. The LeVangers pointed out to the trial court that Mr. 
Welling's Affidavit did not established delivery of the notice to 
all members, hand-delivered or otherwise. Plaintiffs' Memorandum 
in Opposition. R. 312 (Under the heading, Disputed Facts -
"Paragraph 18 of defendant's Statement of Facts is not supported 
by the Affidavit of Scott Welling. No where in the Affidavit 
does Mr. Welling testify that all members received a ballot and 
voting draft by hand delivery."). 
6. There is no provision in the Association's Bylaws as 
they existed in 1994 and 1995, in the Articles of Incorporation 
then in effect, or its CC&R's prior to the current amendments 
that allow members to vote by written ballot. R. 24-34 - Bylaws; 
R. 242-245 - 1972 CC&R's; R. 247-248 - Articles of Incorporation. 
7. Section 2.5 of the Association's Bylaws then in effect 
provided that, at meetings of the members at which a quorum is 
present or represented by proxy "[a]11 votes may be cast by the 
members either in person or by proxy." R. 33. 
8. Section 2.5 of the Bylaws expressly requires proxies to 
be received and verified before the date of the meeting. In 
relevant part, the Section reads as follows: 
Section 2.5 - Voting Requirements. . . . All 
proxies shall be in writing and in the case of proxies 
for the annual meeting, they shall be delivered to a 
credentials committee consisting of the President, a 
6 
Vice President and Secretary of the Association at 
least ten (10) days prior to said annual meeting. 
[Five days in advance of special meetings]. 
R. 33. 
9. Section 2.7 of the Bylaws contemplates only in-person 
meetings of the Association's members. It also allows a method 
for reconvening meetings to take action when a quorum is not 
present. It reads as follows: 
Section 2.7 - Quorum. At any meeting of the 
members, the presence of members holding, or holders of 
proxies entitled to case, more than fifty percent (50%) 
of the total votes of the Association shall constitute 
a quorum for the transaction of business. In the event 
a quorum is not present at a meeting, the members 
present (whether represented in person or by proxy), 
though less than a quorum, may adjourn the meeting to a 
later date. Notice thereof shall be delivered to the 
members as provided above. At the reconvened meeting, 
the members and proxy holders present shall constitute 
a quorum for the transaction of business. 
R. 33. 
10. Section 2.8 of the Bylaws contemplates only in-person 
meetings of the Association's members. It reads as follows: 
Section 2.8 - Waiver of Irregularities. All 
inaccuracies and/or irregularities in calls, notices of 
meetings and in the manner of voting, form of proxies, 
credentials and method of ascertaining those present, 
shall be deemed waived if no objection is made at the 
meeting. 
R. 33. Absent a meeting, objections to inaccuracies and 
irregularities cannot be accomplished as contemplated. 
11. The CC&R's in effect in 1994 contained a provision 
requiring the vote of a majority of the homeowners to amend the 
CC&R's ("unless by vote of the owners of the majority of the lots 
7 
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in said Subdivision; it is agreed to change said Conditions in 
whole or in part.").1 R. 245. 
12. No record date for determining members entitled to cast 
a vote on the proposal to amend the CC&Rfs was established by the 
Board of Trustees of the Association. Deposition testimony of 
JoAnn Vincent, R. 749-752. 
13. The Board of Trustees did not prepare or maintain a 
membership list prior to sending out notice of the proposal to 
adopt the Amended CC&R's or at any time prior to the recording of 
the Amended CC&R's. R. 750-753. 
14. Section 2.6 of the Association's Bylaws allows only 
persons who "appear as members upon the transfer books of the 
Association on the 30th day before such annual members1 meeting," 
to vote. R. 33. 
15. The members were not provided a list of members at any 
meeting of the members of the Association during 1994 and 1995. 
R. 742. 
1
 The paragraph reads in its entirety as follows: 
These conditions shall run with the land and shall 
be binding upon all parties and all persons claiming 
under them until March 10, 1982, at which time said 
Conditions and Covenants shall be automatically 
extended for successive periods of ten (10) years, 
unless by vote of the owners of a majority of the lots 
in said Subdivision, it is agreed to change said 
Conditions in whole or in part. 
R. 33. 
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16. The Board of Trustees prepared a written ballot to seek 
approval of the amended CC&R's, which stated "(to be returned by 
November 30, 1994)." R. 53. 
17. The cover letter with the ballot stated: "Please note: 
the voting period expires November 30, 1994; ballots must be 
returned by that date." (emphasis in original - the only words 
highlighted on the page). R. 54. The cover letter also noted: 
"The enclosed ballot represents a straight up or down expression 
of your opinion." R. 54. 
18. The Board of Trustees determined on its own and without 
property owner notice or approval to "extend the voting period on 
our CC&R's." Newsletter to Members, January, 1995. R. 51. "The 
CCR's had a deadline of November 30, 1994. A year later votes 
were still being solicited. The Association never voted to 
extend the vote or take a new vote." Affidavit of Robert 
Blackbourn, Jr. R. 356. 
19. The Association determined there were 262 lots entitled 
to vote on the Amended CC&R's. R. 512. The Association counted 
149 votes in favor of the Amended CC&R's. R. 512. 
20. Of the ballots counted in favor of the Amended CC&R's 
by the Board of Trustees, 46 are only signed by one of two joint 
tenants. R. 512. 
21. Section 2.5 of the Bylaws of the Association provides 
that "[i]n the case of a membership owned as joint tenants, each 
such joint tenant shall have that number of votes determined by 
9 
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dividing the number of votes attributable to the membership by 
the number of joint tenants who own the membership/' R. 33. 
22. During the year that votes were being solicited, 
ownership of at least 41 lots changed. R. 515-542. 
23. Ten of the votes allegedly cast in favor of the Amended 
CC&R!s were cast by property owners who were not property owners 
at the time of notice of voting on the Amended CC&Rfs. R. 512. 
24. Two of the votes allegedly counted by the Board in 
favor of the Amended CC&Rfs were cast by property owners who were 
not record owners of the lots represented by the ballots. R. 
512. 
25. Four of the votes allegedly cast in favor of the 
Amended CC&R!s were cast by owners claiming ownership of split 
lots, but are shown on the records of the Highland Estates as 
consisting of only one lot. R. 512. 
26. The voting notices sent to members by the Board of 
Trustees misrepresented material facts regarding the proposed 
CC&R's. The notice of ballot voting authorized by the Board of 
Trustees misrepresented that the Amended CC&R's reflected "the 
majority's view of how the subdivision ought to appear and be 
operated . . . ." R. 54. 
27. The Board of Trustees knew, when it authorized the 
statement that the proposed CC&R's were the majority view in the 
subdivision, that far fewer than a majority of the property 
10 
owners had ever participated in the meetings to consider the 
proposed CC&R's. R. 745. 
28. The notice of ballot voting failed to include 
information regarding the more controversial aspects of the 
proposed CC&R's, including the expansion of the authority of the 
Board of Trustees to amend the Bylaws, the authorization for 
ballot voting by members, the ability to restrict or limit voting 
of members, and the ability to levy large, punitive fines for 
violations of the CC&R's. R. 54 - Notice of Balloting Process; 
R. 38-49 - Amended CC&R's as recorded; R. 242-245 - CC&R's in 
effect from 1972. 
29. The statements in the notice of voting by ballot and 
the information omitted was material to the property owners' 
informed vote on the proposed CC&R's. Affidavit of Christie 
Bambery, R. 504. 
30. The Amendment to Declaration of Restrictions and 
Protective Covenants for Highland Estates Subdivision, Summit 
County, Utah, as executed October 3, 1995, and recorded with the 
Summit County Recorder on October 5, 1995, differed in at least i 
two material respects from the draft CC&R's submitted to members 
for their approval, excluding entirely the provision regarding 
limitation of liability for the bridal path easement, and i 
excluding from the definition of residential lots 13 lots. 
Compare R. 756-767 - Voting Draft of CC&R's with R. 768-779 -
Recorded Set of CC&R's. 
11 
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SUMMARY OF .ARGUMENT 
The LeVangers, on behalf of all members of the Association, 
contest the methods employed by the Board of the Association to 
amend the CC&R/ s affecting the members'" property. The trustees 
chose to e mp1o y a ma i I -i n balloting process, inventing ne w r u1e s 
o r :i g i 1 o r :i i 1 g e s t a b 1 i s 1: I e d i: i i J e s o f c o r p o r a t e g o v e r n a i I c e a s :i b 
suited thei r purposes in allegedly obtaining approval for the 
ame i Ide d CC & R'" s T i: I e :i ] : n: i,e 11: I : »d s we r e f a t a ] ] y de f e c t :i ve - i I : 
record date for members entitled to vote was establ ished; notice 
0 f t h € • a ] t e r e d me t h o d f c r a p p r o v :i n g 11 I e ame r I d m e i: I t s \ J a s i I o t 
provided to a 1 1 members ; the deadl ine for: voting was unilaterally 
extended, w:i thout advance notice; property owners who became such 
on 1 y after the voting process began were a 11 owed to cast, ba 11 ots; 
v o t i ng t a11 i e s were j mp roper1y kept. T h ere are genuine issues of 
materia 1 fact (11 Ie :i i I va 1 i d notice and 11: Ie vo 1:e ta 11 ying) and the 
Association i s not entitled to summary judgment on the mad 1-in 
1 .. .- .~ , • : 
Some of • !,• evidence of. impropriety only came to 1:1 ght 
f o ] ] o w :i i i g 11: i e t: r :i a ] :: o i :i r t:'" s g r a i I I: :i i I g : f p a r t :i a ] s i i m m a r \, • j i i d g i ri e i I t , 
but before a new trial date 1 lad been set, and before the partial 
summary judgment had been certified as final and appealabl e. 
Yet, the tria1 court, Judge Brian presiding, r u1ed that f Ie . . , 
n o : need L~ ~ ^ *?(- h^Vanqers" memorandum in support of their 
motion to recons^aei ;:. : :, . ot need to see the new evidence and 
consider its weight. He wrongly held that he did not need to 
1 2 
consider the merits of plaintiffs' new contentions and that 
plaintiffs were too late in submitting the evidence and had 
waived the right to present the evidence. He applied the wrong 
standard of review. The trial court abused its discretion in not 
considering the merits of the LeVangers' motion to reconsider. 
Further, this Court may consider without deference the trial 
court's application of the wrong standard of review. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Association's Attempt to Approve Amended CC&R's by 
Means of Mail-in Balloting was Illegal. 
A. Mail-In Balloting is Not Allowed by the Association's 
Charter Documents or Under Utah Statute. 
Sections 16-6-27 through 32 of the Utah Nonprofit 
Corporation and Co-operative Association Act contemplate only 
in-person meetings when defining the process by which members of 
a nonprofit corporation may take action. The meeting must be 
duly noticed and convened, a quorum must be present, and those 
entitled to vote must be ascertainable. Section 16-6-28 provides 
for giving notice "to each member entitled to vote at [a 
member's] meeting." Section 16-6-29 sets out the manner in which 
a quorum is determined. Section 16-6-30 provides that "[a] 
member may vote in person or, unless the articles of 
incorporation or the bylaws otherwise provide, may vote by proxy 
executed in writing by the member or by his duly authorized 
attorney in fact." 
13 
Sect:i oi 1 ] 6-6-33 provides the exclusive statutory means by 
which action may be taken by members other than in a meeting. It 
provides: 
Any action required by this act to be taken at a 
meeting of the members . . . or any action which may be 
taken at a meeting of the members . . . may be taken 
without a meeting if a consent: in writing, setting 
forth the action so taken, shall be signed by a J 1 the 
members entitled to vote. 
None of the charter documents for the Association, neither 
the Articles, the Bylaws nor the CC&R' s :i n effect at the time of 
the mail -ii I ba11oting, contain provisions a11owing for mai 1 -ii I 
balloting. A ] ] the re1evant provisi ons of the Association's 
charter documents coi Iten ip 1 a.te oi :i ] y :i i I-persoi I n Leetii Igs . 
A Pennsylvania appellate court, faced w :i 1: h a s i t u a t i o n 
s i n: i :i 1 a i t c 1:1 I e o i I e p r e s e n t J \, c o i 11 e s t e d, 1: I e 1 d 11: I a t n i, a i ] :i i I b a. J 1 o t s 
were not allowed as a substitute for an in-person meeting. In 
Sparkes v Wright, 1 5 [ SI ij > C1 E • 1 9 8 8 ) , the t ria 1 
court's null ifying a mail ballot vote to amend Bylaws of the 
nonprofit corporation was affirmed on appeal. After examining 
the bylaws of the corporation and the state nonprofi t 
corporations a c t, t h e co u rt st a t e d: " [W]e no t e n o pro vi si on i i I 
[ the ] statute for presence i i I persoi I a I: a corporate meeti i Ig I: : be 
accomplished by mail ballot of the type utilized in this case. . 
. . C1 e a r J ;y , 11 I e p r <:: v i s :i • : i I s c f S e c t :i o i I 7 7 0 9 c o n t e nip 1 a t e i i n i i < 11 i • 
of communication in whi ch ail persons involved in the meeting can 
"M'jt-di: Hja< \\ ' M M I . . . . HiMJoub't f M ]J q , I h i l j M i l s sul'TiTi.i L t e d Ihq MM i I 
do not provide this type of communicatioi ." 
1 I 
The Utah statutes and the Association's charter documents 
similarly contemplate means by which members can hear one another 
and a give-and-take discussion can occur. The Pennsylvania 
courts struck down a ballot process designed to obtain votes in 
advance of an in-person meeting. How much more imperative it is 
for this Court to strike down a balloting process that occurred 
over an indefinite period with no corresponding member's meeting, 
with no record date for those allowed to participate, and with 
inadequate notice to members regarding material information. 
B. The Mail-in Balloting Process Was Not the Effective 
Equivalent of Soliciting Proxies. 
In the present action, the trial court, in granting the 
Association's summary judgment motion, rightly noted that "there 
is nothing -- few things -- more fundamental to corporations . . 
. than the process by which those entities amend their charter or 
their beginning documents so to speak." Reporter's Partial 
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment: Court's 
Ruling. R. 412. The trial court thereafter wrongly concluded, 
however, that the Association's mail-in balloting process was an 
< 
effective substitute for an in-person meeting to effect such 
fundamental changes. The trial court was persuaded by the 
argument that, since proxies are allowed at in-person meetings, 
mail-in balloting does not injure any fundamental purpose of 
corporate governance.2 The trial court failed to properly view 
the mail-in balloting process in its context. < 
2
 The court noted that: "whereas, here meetings could be 
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A 1: j n - p e r s o i i m e e t :i i 1 g s t h e r e i s a i 1 o j: • p o i: t: i i n :i 1: ] r f o r t h e g :i v e 
and take of discussion. None of that occurred i n this case. The 
notice to members was inadequate to alert them as to the pros and 
cons of the more controversial provisions of the amendments. It 
contained m.isrepresentations. As noted in the Affidavit of 
C hri s t i e Bamb e ry, R. 50 4, members would have voted d if fe r e n11y 
had they been apprised of all 1 the facts, something that 
f a c e -1 o - f a c e 1 t t e e t i 1 1 g s p r o v i d e . 
Effectively, those opposed to the amendments were denied the 
o p p o r 1:1 11 1 j I: ;:;!l , :i 1 1 c j: e 1 1 • :i e b a t e, t • :> p r e s e n t :> p p o s :i n g ^ r j e w s t : • t h o s e 
of the proponents of the amendments. The solicitation of the 
b a ] ] c t s w a s :i : 2 1 e b > 11 1 o s e : 1: e d 11: 1 s c h a 1 1 g e, s o t h a t t: h e y 
had the exc1usive opportunity to persuade. 
It is true that: proxies effectively aid ow persons to vote 
without attending the meeting. However, the monumental 
difference between proxies and ma i ] -:i n ba 11 ots i s that proxies 
are gi ve tc those persons w1 1 o wil 1 a11e 1 1 d the mee111 1 g a 1: 1 d 
represent the interest of the person giving the proxy. Nothing 
o f I:: 1 1 e k :i 1 1 d h a p p e n s \ ; :i 11: 1 1 1: L a :i ] :i 1 1 1: a J ] o t s . 
The trial court was incorrect as a matter of law when 3 t 
^e t e rm^ n e ^  t ^ a t t YXe m a j_ 1 _ j_ n b a 11 o t i ng s ub s f a n t i a J ] y c ornp ] :i e d w :i t h 
Utah law and the Association's charter documents. 
conducted by attendance through proxy, the argument that meetings 
are necessary to encourage the vigorous exchange of vIews, i s 
severely undercut/' R. 416. 
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C. The Mail-in Balloting Process Was Not Made More 
Legitimate Due to the Association's Ability to Achieve the 
Same Result With Even Less Participation at a "Reconvened 
Meeting." 
One argument raised below by the Association, and improperly 
given great weight by the trial court in reaching its decision, 
is the red herring notion that the balloting process was a much 
better substitute than the equally available "reconvened meeting" 
approach.3 As the argument goes, Section 2.7 of the Bylaws 
allows for the calling of a reconvened meeting, at which any 
members then present constitute a quorum for the transaction of 
business. The Association argued that that section could have 
been used by the trustees to achieve the same result but was 
consciously disregarded in favor of the more participatory 
mail-in balloting process. 
That argument fails completely given the specific provision 
of the CC&R's requiring a majority of the property owners to 
approve changes to the CC&R's. That more specific requirement 
under the then-effective CC&R's controlled over the more general 
bylaw provision dealing with quorum requirements at reconvened 
meetings. 
3
 The trial court noted: 
If I were to point out, however, the most salient 
reason that, in my view, the [ballot] voting process 
was an appropriate substitute, it's this: That based 
on the state of the record, the reconvened meeting 
process was detrimental to the fundamental objective of 
encouraging and maximizing participation in the 
decision-making. 
R. 416. 
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11: :i s 1 : J a c k - letter law that in interpreting potentially 
conflicting clauses, specific provisions control over general 
provisions. 3e* , . twin Lakes Village Property v. Crowley, 
857 P.°d 611 , >.-, ; ,r 1993) P [I: >] ecause_corporate 
documents are equivalent to contracts among the members, the 
norma ] r u 1 e s governing 11 i e :i i I t: e r p r e t a t i o i I • : f :: • : i I t r a • : t s a p p ] y 
I I: :i s well established that specific provisions i n a 
c o i 11: r a c t c oi I t r o ] o ve r g e n e r a J p r o v i s :i on s . . . .' ) ; I lormai I v. 
Recreation Centers of Sun City, 752 P. 2d 514, 51.7 (Arize Apr . 
1988). 
The trustees did not have the option of approving amendments 
1:o 1:1 ie CC&R' s at a sparsely attended "reconvened meeting," since 
a majority of property owners had to approve any amendment to 
them. The trial court should not have gi ven the weight i t did to 
the manufactured contention that mai 1 -ii I balloting was to be 
preferred over reconvened meetings. 
becoml, 111*:* Ksyoci.it ion n >u sayr. il nl I lui *- t-'hij - lu
 y t'd 
the reconvened meeting scenario but wanted to obtain 
p a i: t i c i p a t :i o i :i 11 I f a :: t 11: I e A s s o c :i a t :i o i I w a n t e d t o a v o :i d a 
meeting. It had had previous meetings at: which there was heated 
-i n-^si r ••'^rd: r;: - hanues to the C C & K ' S . The itiatter had 
aiways beei Lablea. i-r..c.r presidents of the Association had 
attempted to obtain approval for CC&R amendments and had been 
rebuffed. The Association's argument regarding increased 
participation flies in the face of the facts and is disingenuous. 
1 8 
D. Mail-In Balloting Coupled With Failure to Establish 
Record Date, Open Extension of Voting Period, and Failure of 
Notice Rendered the Association's Actions Unlawful. 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the mail-in 
balloting process alone was not illegal, the facts before the 
trial court clearly established a pattern of conduct throughout 
the voting process that invalidated the results. 
The prior attorney for the Association, Scott Welling, filed 
an Affidavit which was represented to the trial court as 
establishing the fact of adequate delivery of the notice of the -
mail-in balloting to the members. No where in the Affidavit does 
Mr. Welling testify to the fact of delivery of the documents by 
any means to the members of the Association. The Affidavit of 
Mr. Ferrigno, the current President of the Association, clearly 
establishes the contrary fact. Notice of the balloting process 
was not given to all members and is, thus, fatally flawed. 
Had the notice been intended for an in-person meeting, the 
members who failed to receive proper notice of the meeting would 
have had a means for protesting the improper notice. In an ad 
hoc mail-in balloting, extending over more than one year, must 
members invent ad hoc methods for objecting to the adequacy of 
the notice as well? One can plainly see how, once begun in ad 
hoc fashion, the entire Association governing process becomes 
tainted. 
Even more importantly, assuming the notice was properly 
given to members, it defined a deadline for the mail-in voting to 
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enr\ 11ovpn11»( M 1 fi , 1 ' * 0 4 „ Yet,,. admi11ed 1 y without advance or 
complete notice to members, the Association's board unilateral.! y 
extended the balloting for more than 9 months thereafter. 
This highlights another important aspect of wI Iy thi s ad 1: I• :>c 
process of obtaining members' votes was doomed to result in a 
c o m p 1 e t e d e n i a 1 o f m e m b e r s ' I i. g h I.; • y < > v ^ r 11 I i i»- •. i i a f f. a i r s . 
Those trustees in favor of amending the CC&R's, having created 
t h e n i I w ni .id Inn' vol lug p r oi.'p.ss , imi ."i.i1 J I t h i n g w r o n g i n t h 
extending the voting deadline indefinitely4 ai id without advance 
r i o t: i c e , o i I c e :i t b e c a n L e a p p a r e i I t 11" I a t, b;; , N o v e in b e r 3 0, 1 9 9 4 , there 
were not sufficient votes to approve the amendments. A should 
i i c I: 1: e f orgo11en 1:hat the November 30th deadline was announced : n 
the only notice claimed by the .Association to have been provided 
to the members
 r e g a r d i n g the vote to be taken on the CC&R 
amendments. 
Natura 11 y, since it had. beeome thej r game , p 1 ayed accordi ng 
to rules they invented as they wer It a 1 oi Ig, 1:1 ie 1: r astees i 11 I : 
favored the CC&R amendments failed to g:i ve thought to whether 
m e mb e r s s h o i i ] d i I o w {a f t e r p a s s :i i I q o f 11: I e a i I i i o i 11 I c e d d e a d ] i i I e ) b e 
a1lowed t o re-vote, t o rescind their v o t e s, t o vo t e o r I wh et h e r t o 
e x 1: e i I • :i 1 1 I e d e a d ] i n e f o r v o t i i I g, t o b e g i v en a new dead J i r I e, o r t o 
have a new record date of those eligible to vote established and 
4
 The January, 1995 newsletter established no new deadline for the 
mail-in ballot voting process, simply announcing that "he 
Homeowners Board has voted to extend the voting period _,.. cur 
CC&R's." R 51 
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announced, all in fairness to the members' fundamental rights as 
owners of the Association. Why weren't members told in advance 
of the proposal to extend the deadline, and to hear and consider 
the reasons for desiring to extend the deadline? 
Just as importantly, no one in charge determined a "record 
date" for determining those members allowed to vote on the 
measure.5 Thus, over the extended period that voting occurred, 
property ownership changed hands in at least 41 instances and 10 
of those new owners voted in favor of the matter. 
The proponents' zeal to adopt the amendments to the CC&R's, 
and their belief that they could invent the rules that seemed 
appropriate, also led them to count multiple votes on so-called 
5
 Highlighting the importance of a record date, Section 16-10a-707 
of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act provides for 
statutorily fixing a record date in the absence of one being set 
by those in authority: 
(1) The bylaws may fix or provide the manner of 
fixing the record date for one or more voting groups in 
order to determine the shareholders entitled to be 
given notice of a shareholders' meeting, to determine 
shareholders entitled to take action without a meeting, 
to demand a special meeting, to vote, or to take any 
other action. If the bylaws do not fix or provide for 
the manner of fixing a record date, the board of 
directors of the corporation may fix a future date as 
the record date. 
(2) If not otherwise fixed under Section 
16-10a-703 or Subsection (1), the record date for 
determining shareholders entitled to notice of and to 
vote at an annual or special shareholders' meeting is 
the close of business on the day before the first 
notice is delivered to shareholders. 
(emphasis added). 
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" i ] 1 ega 1 ] y sj: • ] :i t ] < : > t , 3 , '' w\ 1 ich were c 1 ear 1 y not recorded as such 
with the County. Also, they did not. feel compelled to count 
joint tenar.'-*. votes as only h of a vote in cases where the ballot 
was clearly w-iiy signed by a single 'joint. h-Mian! . 
The trial court's determi nation, therefore, not only is 
against the great weigh t < :> 1 a 1.111:1: 1 o r :i t \/ : • 1: 1 1:1: 1 e i s s u e b 1 11 a ] s o 
complete]y ignored the cumulative effect of granting the trustees 
the nyhl I i^al^ 1 iih-\s whn h llln-y det <:-*rTn 1 n^d I ' » b»- littler 
suited for the situation faced by the Association. As usual, 
se] f -inter€ • s t ] ed t : 11: 1 e • c 1 :eati o 1 1 • : f one s:i d€ ad hoc rules, a 1 1 d 
the ignoring of other, plainly stated ai id specific rules 
• ' - :i 1 i L I le Assoc! ation' s charter documents . 
II. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Failing to 
Consider the Probative Value of Addi tional Evidence and Employing 
the Wrong Standard of Review 
:he trial rouri wrongiy ruled that it was constrained by the 
:.-'>-n'-s.c r '- the submission of new evidence by plaintiffs to deny, 
soiely on procedural grounds, picuntLri., motion to reconsider 
the grant r r nummary judgment. The * r 1 'ourt noted that it had 
seen none .: -_ :.L memoranda or JI:W-. ,: -ii.i>n.s ieyctrding 
plaintiffs" motion ' • re/ons: Jer Tne 'rial court abused it.; 
_; . • r , _ !-;.-. j a s o n 1 e v i e w t h ^ 
pleaoings • the evidence submitted r\ ..aintiffs in making its 
1:1 il ing . 
In its 0rder, the tria1 court noted that P1aintiffs' failure 
: t:c: : bta i n 11: 1 e :ioc 1 1 me 1 11s and additional evidence prior to 
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the hearing on the Association's motion for summary judgment 
constituted "a waiver of the basis on which plaintiffs now seek 
reconsideration and procedurally there is no basis to set aside 
the order of the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring granting the 
defendant summary judgment." R. 1065. The trial court 
incorrectly applied a standard of review based on Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in cases in which the summary 
judgment motion resolves all matters in a case, and not on Rule 
54 (b), when partial summary judgment can be reviewed and revised 
at any time before conclusion of the entire case. 
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that in cases where an order or decision of the court does not 
dispose of all the issues or the claims, "the order or other form 
of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties." The Utah Supreme Court, in Timm 
v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 (1993) has noted: "We have also 
previously held that rule 54 (b) permits reconsideration of a 
non-final judgment ^since it facilitates the just and speedy < 
resolution of disputes in the trial court.' Kennedy v. New Era 
Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979)." Judge Nehring, in 
the hearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment, noted 
that the court's ruling did not dispose of all issues in the 
case. The trial court was free to reconsider its decision. 
23 
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The newly obtained evidence included the ballots relied on 
by the Association's board in approving the recording of amended 
CC&R's, previously denied plaintiffs during earlier stages of 
discovery by the Association. That evidence clearly establishes 
that the Association did not approve the amendments to the CC&R's 
by majority vote of the members. Votes were miscounted. Votes 
by one of two joint tenants were counted as one vote, plainly in 
violation of the express provisions of the Bylaws. New move-ins 
were allowed to vote throughout the balloting process. Lots were 
improperly given multiple votes. 
The Affidavits submitted with the motion to reconsider 
clearly establish that written notice of the balloting process 
was not provided to members and that members would have voted 
differently had they been aware of the contents of the proposed 
amended CC&R's. 
Plaintiffs' motion to reconsider fell squarely within the 
exception to the "law of the case" doctrine set out by this 
Court. The law of the case doctrine suggests denial of motions 
to reconsider when, "in the case of summary judgment, a 
subsequent motion fails to present the case in a different light, 
such as when no new, material evidence is introduced." Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. James Constructors, 761 P.2d 42, 43 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). Here there was new and material evidence for the trial 
court to consider and it was an abuse of its discretion to rule 
that, procedurally, the plaintiffs were "too late" with the 
24 
information. There was no new trial date set. All issues in the 
case had not been disposed of. The parties were not prejudiced 
by the timing of the submission of the new evidence, and the 
evidence was highly probative. 
In Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994), this Court noted what factors a court could consider 
determining the propriety of reconsidering a prior 
ruling. These may include, but are not limited to, 
when (1) the matter is presented in a "different light" 
or udner "different circumstances;" (2) there has been 
a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new 
evidence; (4) "manifest injustice" will result if the 
court does not reconsider the prior ruling; (5) a court 
needs to correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was 
inadequately briefed when first contemplated by the 
court. 
Id. at 1311 (citations omitted). 
When a trial court simply chooses to ignore the motion, as 
it did in this case, and give no consideration to any of those 
factors, it is clearly an abuse of its discretion. 
Trial courts in Utah have been overturned for relying on 
purely procedural grounds in denying motions to reconsider. 
< 
Thus, in Timm, 851 P.2d at 1185, the decision of the trial court 
on the motion to reconsider was reversed and the trial court was 
told to "address the motion on its merits." 
In the present case, the trial court applied the wrong 
standard of review in determining that it was inappropriate for 
it to consider the new evidence and reconsider its decision. < 
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That constituted an abuse of discretion and misapplication of the 
law. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in 
favor of the Association was incorrect and should be reversed. 
There are genuine issues of material fact and the Association is 
not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. 
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider 
the merits of the LeVangers' motion to reconsider. The court 
applied the wrong standard of review and the trial court's 
decision must be reversed. 
DATED: June 25, 1999. 
ROBINSON & SHEEN, L.L.C. 
V 
By ^  , -yr^ .^-w-^^, 
. Jay/Sheer 
Attorneys for the LeVangers 
Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(11) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, no addendum to Appellant's Brief is necessary. 
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